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Abstract: The evidence that earnings rise with firm size and that human capital affects earnings based 
on labour market data are two of the most robust empirical findings in economics. In contrast the 
evidence for scale economies in firm data is very weak. The limited direct evidence of human capital 
on firm productivity suggests that human capital is indeed productive and that the magnitudes are 
consistent with the findings based on individual data. The common objection to accepting the role of 
size and human capital as determinants of either earnings or productivity has been the role of 
unobserved factors. In this paper we investigate the roles of size and human capital in determining both 
earnings and productivity using a panel data set of matched labour firm data which allows us to control 
for such factors. We argue that neither the unobservable quality of labour, nor the unobservable 
characteristics of the workplace, is the source of the relationship between firm size and earnings, and 
that this effect can have a rent-sharing interpretation. For our data human capital is of minor 
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   1 
1 Introduction 
 
Why do we observe such a large dispersion of labour productivity, capital intensity and 
earnings by firm size both in developed and developing countries? In this paper we use firm-
level panel data from Ghana’s manufacturing sector and consider three potential answers to 
that question. The first is that large firms use more skilled labour than small ones and this 
explains the higher labour productivity and higher earnings. Oi and Idson (1999) pp.2189-
2207 survey the reasons why firm size and many dimensions of workforce skills and 
workplace characteristics may be correlated. The second potential answer relates to 
technology. If large and small firms operate with distinct technologies, this may explain why 
we observe substantial differences in capital intensity over the size range. A comprehensive 
discussion of this issue in the context of Indian industrial policy can be found in Little, 
Mazumdar and Page (1987). The third possible explanation we consider is that of 
imperfections in the factor markets, both for labour and capital. Information problems in 
financial markets ensure a link from firm characteristics to investment decisions, Hubbard 
(1998). One implication of these findings is that capital costs will differ by the size of firm if 
size affects access to capital. 
The first two of these explanations are consistent with competitive labour markets. In 
particular, if the technology is non-homothetic, then factor ratios are predicted to change with 
output even under constant factor prices (Pack, 1982). Further, large firms potentially benefit 
from economies of scale. There is an extensive theoretical literature on their potential 
importance in developing countries, however there is little empirical evidence to suggest that 
they are large. Tybout (2000, p. 180) notes that while there is some evidence for locally 
increasing returns to scale for very small enterprises, “scale economies are more consistently 
missing in studies of microenterprises based on estimated production functions.”  
The third explanation is in terms of imperfect factor markets. However, imperfections 
in capital markets does not without qualifications explain why earnings would be higher in 
large than in small firms. The reason may simply be that large firms with access to cheaper 
capital use more skilled labour, e.g. because of complementarities between physical and 
human capital. An alternative explanation is that there are imperfections in the labour market. 
Empirical studies both for developed and developing countries indicate that firm size has 
explanatory power in earnings regressions even when conditioning on human capital 
variables, such as education and experience (see Brown and Medoff, 1989, and Troske, 1997, 
for analyses based on U.S. data; see Mazumdar, 1983, and Valenchik, 1997, for evidence 
from developing countries). This would be consistent with the textbook model of a 
competitive labour market if unobserved skills, or workplace characteristics which affect 
productivity, were associated with firm size. If, controlling for all such factors, size remains 
significant then this may be indicative of non-competitive markets.  
These issues are by no means new ones. Blanchflower et al (1996, p. 227), for 
instance, point out that “one of the oldest questions in economics is that of whether the market 
for labor can be represented satisfactorily by a standard competitive model”. Testing and 
distinguishing between various hypotheses has proved difficult however, mainly because of 
the impact of unobservable variables and because, in some cases, directions of causality are 
inherently difficult to determine in cross-section data. The data set we use in this paper 
enables us to address such difficulties. We use detailed panel data on manufacturing firms in 
Ghana, which not only enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneity by including 
controls for firm fixed effects, but also provides us with a rich set of potential instruments 
enabling us to address issues of endogeneity and measurement errors in explanatory variables. 
Applying an efficient generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator to these data, we can 
therefore interpret the empirical findings as causal results. Another attractive feature of the 
data set is that it contains matched firm-level employee data, so that we can use individual 
information about the characteristics of the workforce to create firm-level human capital 
variables.  
In the next section we set out how we intend to capture the effects of observable skills 
and unobserved factors in determining both productivity and earnings. The data is described   2 
in Section 3. The production function is estimated in Section 4, and the relationship between 
earnings and firm size is investigated in Section 5. Explicit tests for competitive labour 
markets are carried out in Section 6. A final section concludes.   
 
2  Modelling Productivity and Earnings 
To determine the role of human capital and firm size in determining productivity and earnings 
we will focus on the production function and the earnings equation. The production function 
estimates will enable us to characterise the technology with which firms operate and shed 
light on the importance of human capital for productivity performance. The dimensions of 
technology which we are most interested in investigating are i) if there is any evidence that 
technology is non-homothetic, in which case factor intensities may vary with firm size even 
under constant factor prices; ii) if there is any evidence for increasing returns to scale, in 
which case firms would have incentives to expand employment, possibly leading to an 
upward pressure on earnings; and iii) how human capital impacts on productivity 
performance. The estimated earnings function will inform the analysis of the role of human 
capital and size as determinants of earnings, and it will form the basis for testing for 
imperfections in the labour market. For the latter purpose it is useful to evaluate the estimated 
earnings function both independent of, and in conjunction with, the production function 
results.  
 
Human capital, productivity and the technology 
In our analysis of the technology we shall initially assume that the production function can be 
approximated by a translog specification (Berndt and Christensen, 1972). We write this in 
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where i and t are firm and time subscripts, Y is output
1, h is a vector of human capital 
characteristics, Xj  is the j:th input in the production process, j=1,2,…, J,  i µ  is a firm specific 
effect, the Dt are time dummies measuring common shocks to the firms over time, ε is a 
serially uncorrelated random shock to productivity and α, λ, β and δ denote parameters to be 
estimated. The translog specification is attractive because of its flexibility, in the sense that it 
nests or approximates a number of popular models in the literature. As discussed above the 
translog form is especially useful because it allows tests for whether the technology is non-
homothetic, Little, Mazumdar and Page (1987) proceed in this way. We shall also test for 
constant returns to scale, and for the standard Cobb-Douglas form implied by the restriction 
on [1] that βkm= 0 for all k, m. If the latter restriction holds, we obtain 
 
[2]  it t t t i j jit j it t i it D X h Y Y ε δ µ β α λ + + + + + = ∑ ∑ − ln ln ln 1 , .  
 
In our empirical analysis we will use as inputs in the production process labour, 
denoted  L, physical capital, K, raw material inputs, M, and indirect inputs, I, while the 
arguments of the human capital vector, hit, are the average level of education, tenure and age 
of employees in the firm. Our specification hence allows explicitly for the labour augmenting 
aspect of human capital on labour input. This is easily seen in [2] where human capital 
augmented labour (anti-logged) is e
αhL, which follows Hall and Jones (1999) and Bils and 
                                                 
1 We choose to model gross output rather than value-added in view of recent research by Basu 
and Fernald (1995) showing that adopting a value-added production function can yield misleading 
results if there is imperfect competition or increasing returns to scale.   3 
Klenow (2000). As will be seen below, this formulation is closely linked to the Mincerian 
earnings equation. We include a lagged dependent variable in the production function to 
capture the fact that whenever factors of production are changed it may take time for output to 
reach its new long-run level (see Nickell, 1996, for a similar specification). Further, we allow 
for inter-firm differences in expected productivity due to firm specific effects,  i µ , reflecting 
for instance differences in managerial technology along the lines argued by Lucas (1978). We 
allow these unobserved firm effects to be freely correlated with the inputs and the human 
capital variables. Of course, the availability of panel data is crucial for being able to control 
for firm specific effects in this manner, yet without such controls it would not be possible to 
analyse the dimensions of firm performance with which we are concerned.
2  
 
Human capital, earnings and the labour market 
Turning to the determinants of earnings, our point of departure is the standard Mincerian 
framework stating that differences in individual log earnings are driven exclusively by 
differences in human capital,  h w α = ln . This will be an appropriate specification if the labour 
market is competitive so that firms are wage-takers, and if the observed human capital 
variables reflect true labour quality. However, as noted in the introduction, stylised facts both 
from developed and developing countries typically show that earnings are positively 
correlated with firm size even conditional on differences in human capital.
3 As an initial step 
towards a model incorporating labour market imperfections, we therefore augment the 
Mincerian earnings function with a measure of firm size. Adding controls for unobserved firm 
fixed effects, denoted  i η , time dummies, a lagged dependent variable to capture the 
adjustment process in earnings over time and a serially uncorrelated residual,  it ν , we hence 
write our baseline earnings function as 
[3]  it i t t t it t i it it D L w h w ν η θ γ ρ ψ + + + + + = ∑ − ln ln ln 1 , , 
where ψ, ρ, γ and θ are parameters to be estimated. This specification can hence be thought of 
as forming a basis for a simple test of the neoclassical human capital model: if the latter is a 
correct specification, then we would expect an insignificant coefficient on the size variable 
once we control for unobservable characteristics of employees and their workplace. As we 
shall see in the empirical analysis, however, size does turn out to have significant explanatory 
power in our earnings regressions after such controls. We then probe the data further, as there 
are several potential explanations for such a result. For our purposes it is of particular interest 
to see if we can relate the size effect to imperfections in the labour market. 
                                                 
2 Much of the work using panel data to analyse productivity and efficiency has used variants 
of random effects models. A general class of such models, which specialises to several in the literature, 
is presented in Battese and Coelli (1992). Unfortunately, if the firm effects are correlated with the 
inputs then the technology parameter estimates from these models will be biased. This is an important 
issue given the question we are posing. If firms with better management are using more inputs, for 
instance, failure to control for this will lead to biased results.  
3 Bulow and Summers (1986) suggest that large firms pay efficiency wages (see below) 
because monitoring is more expensive in large than in small firms. Oi and Idson (1999) argue that the 
observed size-earnings profile is essentially the result of omitted labour quality variables: large firms 
have a higher demand for skilled labour than do small firms, and to the extent that there are unobserved 
dimensions of skills, then, this will be absorbed by the size variable in size-augmented earnings 
regressions. Brown and Medoff (1989) suggest that firms that pay their workers more are more likely 
to survive and grow, and that the size effect therefore reflects omitted age effects. Masters (1969) 
advocates a theory of compensating wage differentials based on the premise that working conditions 
(which can be thought of as an unobserved variable) in larger firms are worse than in smaller ones, and 
that workers in large firms therefore must be compensated. Doeringer and Piore (1971) put forward a 
theory of internal labour markets, where as internal recruitment is less costly than hiring outsiders, 
large firms are willing to pay wage premiums to workers at low levels in the hierarchy in order to retain 
a sufficiently large pool of potential workers to consider for promotion.   4 
The issue whether labour markets can be represented by a standard competitive 
model has been examined empirically by numerous authors, see Slichter (1950), Dickens and 
Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1987, 1988), Katz and Summers (1989), Van Reenen 
(1996) and Blanchflower et al (1996) for developed countries and Teal (1996), Valenchik 
(1997) and Azam (2001) for developing countries. These studies document unexplained 
industry or firm wage differentials and, in some cases, examine the link between wages and 
firm or industry profitability. Blanchflower et al (1996) discuss three reasons why earnings 
may be positively correlated with profitability. In the first framework the employees get a 
share of the rents generated by the firm as a result of a bargaining process.
4 Because this rent-
sharing process is an equilibrium outcome, predicting a long-run correlation between earnings 
and profits per employee, it is inconsistent with the competitive labour market model. The 
second framework is a competitive model where the short-run supply curve of labour slopes 
upward. Firms in booming industries will hire more workers and accordingly move up the 
labour supply curve, which puts an upward pressure on earnings. Hence this model predicts a 
short-run correlation between earnings and levels of profit, and if the wage elasticity of labour 
demand is less than unity, there will also be a short-run correlation between earnings and 
profits per employee. In the long run, however, there will be no correlation as the labour 
supply curve gradually becomes horizontal.
5 The third theory is a labour contract model in 
which risk-sharing is the optimal contract if both workers and the firm are risk averse. Shocks 
to profitability will thus affect earnings as the firm is unwilling to bear the entire risk of 
unforeseen income fluctuations, and therefore in the long run profits and earnings will be 
positively correlated. Like the rent-sharing model, this risk-sharing framework is inconsistent 
with competitive labour markets. 
In the previous models causality runs from firm performance to earnings. An 
alternative framework is that of efficiency wages, where causality runs in the reverse 
direction (see Stiglitz 1974, Weiss 1980, Akerlof, 1982, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1986, for theoretical rationales for the payment of efficiency wages and Raff and 
Summers 1987, Wadhwani and Wall (1991), Levine (1992), Moll (1993), and Huang et al 
(1998), for tests). This theory concerns situations where the firm offers workers wage 
premiums in order to provide incentives for the workers to put forth more work effort. This 
may be due to the need to prevent shirking, lowering turnover costs or improving the quality 
of applicants. The common factor across the theories is that wages paid by the firm will be 
higher than the outside wage option and that this will increase the productivity of the firm.  
In the empirical analysis we shall focus on unobserved human capital, rent or risk 
sharing and efficiency wages as potential explanations why earnings vary with size. The 
theories of rent and risk sharing predict that earnings are affected by the performance of the 
firm. Although rent and risk sharing have very similar predictions in terms of the effect of 
performance on earnings, we propose to test for rent-sharing by adding to the baseline 
specification [3] two proxies for the rents in the firm: profits per employee in time t, () it L π , 
and the prediction of log of output in time t scaled by a firm specific time invariant constant, 
() () i it Y E ω ln . For profits per employee we will follow the standard procedure in the literature 
and use lagged values in the empirical specification, partly to mitigate endogeneity problems 
(Blanchflower et al, 1996). To construct a measure of  () () i it Y E ω ln  we will use the parameter 
estimates from the production function, the idea being that workers base their expectations 
about the rents available in the firm in the near future on the observed input levels. We write 
our most general rent-sharing model as 
                                                 
4 While the role of unions has been the traditional focus in bargaining theory, the model can 
also be seen as one between “insiders” and the firm, where the insiders derive bargaining power from 
turnover costs (Van Reenen, 1996).  
5 Hence this model is arguably less relevant at the firm-level than at higher levels of 
aggregation, if the assumption of a horizontal labour supply curve from the point of view of the firm is 
acceptable.   5 
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While acknowledging that it is difficult to distinguish between rent and risk sharing, we argue 
that significant coefficients on the lagged measures of rents would be indicative of rent 
sharing rather than risk sharing. A significant coefficient on  () () i it Y E ω ln  would be 
consistent with both frameworks. In the empirical analysis we shall express the term 
() () i it Y E ω ln  as  () i it Y E ω ln ln − , where the latter term will go into the fixed effect. 
  Finally we can now readily test for efficiency wages. The wage premium paid by the 
firm should enter the production function [2], assuming the Cobb-Douglas form is accepted 
by the data, as an additional term:  
 
[5]  it it t t t i j jit j it t i it w D X h Y Y ε φ δ µ β α λ + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ − ln ln ln ln 1 ,  
As equation [5] controls for the human capital impact on productivity, adding the term in 
earnings is equivalent to adding a premium in earnings. We will instrument and test for the 
significance of this variable in determining productivity. If firms are paying efficiency wages 
then the elasticity of output with respect to the wage will equal the elasticity with respect to 
employment, see Levine (1992) for an application.  
 
Econometric method: The generalised method of moments estimator 
To be able to give the parameter estimates in the production function and the earnings 
equation a causal interpretation, we need to deal with the fact that the explanatory variables 
are likely to be correlated both with the equation error and with the firm specific effect. In the 
production function, for instance, the regressors will be correlated with the equation error if 
managers alter their inputs in response to contemporaneous shocks to output, while in the 
earnings function firm size will be endogenous in that any effect from size onto earnings will 
induce the firms to economise on labour. It is also likely that explanatory variables in both 
equations are measured with error, which would lead to a downward bias in the estimated 
coefficients. To address this problem we will use an instrumental variables approach, where 
we exploit the panel dimension of the data and use lagged values of the explanatory variables 
as instruments.
6 As this approach rules out using the within transformation to wipe out the 
firm effects (see e.g. Griliches and Hausman, 1986), we will take first differences. However, 
recent research has shown that lagged levels will be weak instruments for contemporaneous 
differences when data are highly persistent, potentially giving rise to finite sample bias and 
poor precision of the estimates (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Therefore we follow Blundell and 
Bond and combine the differenced equation with a levels equation to form a system 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator, which uses lagged levels as instruments 
for contemporaneous differences and lagged differences as instruments for contemporaneous 
levels.
7 Naturally, the legitimacy of this procedure hinges on the instruments being valid, 
                                                 
6 Clearly, this is one important benefit of panel data. In the case where the researcher has 
cross-section data only, purging explanatory variables from simultaneity typically requires extraneous 
information of the kind rarely available in practice. 
7 In highly persistent time series, lagged levels will be poor instruments for contemporaneous 
differences but lagged differences may still be good instruments for contemporaneous levels. For 
instance if X follows a random walk, Xt = Xt-1 + εt, implying ∆Xt = εt, then Xt-1 will be uncorrelated with 
∆Xt, but ∆Xt will nevertheless be correlated with Xt. Blundell and Bond (1998) present results from a 
Monte Carlo experiment indicating that the system GMM estimator performs substantially better than 
the standard differenced GMM when the data are highly persistent. Recent papers following this 
approach are Blundell and Bond (2000), Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000) and Windmeijer 
(2000).   6 
which will be tested. We provide a brief discussion of the system GMM estimator in 
Appendix 1. 
 
3  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data is drawn from surveys of Ghana’s manufacturing sector which have been conducted 
over the 1990s. Annual data is available for the period 1991 to 1997. The data was collected 
in face-to-face interviews with the firms’ management. At the same time as the firms were 
surveyed a sample of workers and apprentices was chosen from each firm designed to cover 
the full range of personnel employed by the firms. The objective was to have up to 10 
workers and 10 apprentices from each firm where firm size allowed. As a result of this survey 
design it is possible to use the responses from workers in the firm to create firm-level 
averages of worker characteristics. During the course of the surveys a sub-set of 153 firms 
have provided data on the components of value-added and sufficient information that the 
capital stock, employment and the human capital stock of the firm could be calculated for at 
least three consecutive years. In the regression we lag the physical capital stock by one year 
so the maximum period over which we can observe the firms is six years. The resulting 
unbalanced panel contains 732 observations. The three major additions to the primary data are 
the derivation of physical stocks from investment flows, the calculation of firm-level human 
capital stocks based on worker information and the construction of firm specific price indices 
for outputs and material inputs. These prices, which differ for outputs and costs, are used to 
deflate all output and inputs into constant price (1991) domestic currency prices. The 
consumer price index is used to deflate earnings. All references in the text and tables refer to 
these deflated values for output, input, physical capital stock and earnings 
To obtain a measure of the human capital stock available to the firm it was necessary 
to merge the worker with firm level information. The human capital stock comprises the 
following elements: the age of the workforce, their education in years and the tenure of the 
workers. In aggregating from the worker to the firm level it is necessary to use weights to 
ensure that we can move from individual data to firm based averages. To do this we weighted 
the human capital variables by the proportion of workers in a given occupational class within 
the firm. Eight common occupational groups across the rounds of the survey were identified. 
These occupational categories for the worker level data are matched with the occupational 
categories given in the firm level data.
8  
The average size of firm, measured by employment across the seven rounds of the 
data, is 67 employees and the standard deviation is 113, so the range of enterprises covered by 
the survey is very large. Firms range in size from 2 to 841 employees. In order to provide a 
perspective on the data Table 1 presents the variables we will be modelling. Four size 
categories are identified: the micro which is firms with less than six employees, small those 
with from 6 to 30, medium those with from 31 to 99, and large those with 100, or more, 
employees. In Table 1 the variables presented have been purged of sectoral and time effects 
as explained in the notes to the table. The rises in the log of output, and capital, per employee 
in moving from micro to large firms is enormous. For output per employee the rise is nearly 
three fold. For both output, and capital, per employee there is a monotonic increase over the 
whole size range. In contrast the capital to output ratio is approximately constant across the 
size range and the variation in human capital across the firms is much smaller. The figures for 
earnings are firm-level hourly rates, defined as the sum of the basic wage and allowances, and 
these rise by a factor of just over three across the size range identified. These firm-level wage 
rates are derived from the individual labour data in a similar manner to that already described 
for the human capital variables. The central issue posed by the data is how this very large 
dispersion of labour productivity, capital intensity and earnings across firms of different sizes 
                                                 
8 A data appendix explaining the details of this procedure is available on request from the 
authors.   7 
is to be explained. The descriptive statistics simply confirm that it is not a sectoral effect and 
not due to changes over the period of the survey. 
 
4  Technology and the Determinants of Productivity 
 
In addressing the issue of technology and productivity, three issues are central to our 
investigation: whether technology is non-homothetic; whether there are increasing returns to 
scale; and how human capital impacts on productivity performance. We begin by focussing 
on the functional form of the production function. Table 2 shows summary statistics
9 based on 
non-dynamic translog production functions, where Column [1] is based on the OLS results, 
Column [2] on the within estimator and Column [3] on the system GMM results. For neither 
estimator can we reject the null hypothesis of homotheticity at conventional levels of 
significance, suggesting that technology is not the reason why we observe differing factor 
intensities over the size range. Further, we cannot reject the joint hypothesis of homotheticity 
and constant returns to scale.
10 Quasi-concavity is fulfilled by between 38 and 53 per cent of 
the observations depending on which estimator is being used, while monotonicity is fulfilled 
by between 55 and 63 per cent.
11 The OLS and within estimators strongly indicate that the 
Cobb-Douglas model is not an appropriate approximation of the technology with which firms 
operate, as we in both cases can reject the simpler model at the 1 per cent level of 
significance. Neither of these two models will yield consistent results in the presence of 
endogeneity and measurement errors, however, so too much should not be made from this 
finding and when we use instruments to address these problems in Column [3] we can easily 
accept the Cobb-Douglas model (p-value = 0.73).  
Given that the data appear to be consistent with a Cobb-Douglas specification we 
proceed in Table 3 showing parameter estimates for this specification. Columns [1]-[3] show 
OLS-estimates of various specifications of the Cobb-Douglas production function as a 
benchmark. In Column [1], which is estimated without dynamics or fixed effects, all input 
coefficients are positive and highly significant.
12 These coefficients, directly interpretable as 
elasticities of output, sum to 1.00 so we can easily accept constant returns to scale. In Column 
[2] we control for firm fixed effects, which yields smaller elasticities than in Column [1] 
including a collapsed coefficient on physical capital (0.0005).
13 The input coefficients now 
sum to 0.83, and the fact that we cannot reject constant returns at conventional levels of 
significance (the p-value is 0.16) is due to the poorly identified capital coefficient.
14 In 
                                                 
9 The full set of the results is available from the authors on request. 
10 See the notes under Table 3 for details on how we test for homotheticity and constant 
returns to scale. 
11 Monotonicity requires that each input has a positive marginal product, and quasi-concavity 
requires that the bordered Hessian matrix of first and second partial derivatives of the production 
function are negative semi-definite. In the translog specification the marginal products and the partial 
derivatives depend both on the values of the inputs and on the estimated parameters, and we therefore 
investigate if monotonicity and quasi-concavity holds at each data point.  
12 In the regression we control for industry heterogeneity by including sectoral dummy 
variables, time effects (due to, say, demand fluctuations or price changes not captured by the deflators) 
by wave dummies and location effects by dummies for geographical area. We do not report the 
associated coefficients in order to conserve space. 
13 Numerous productivity studies based on firm-level data both from developed and 
developing countries report drastically lower input coefficients in the production function when going 
from OLS to a “within” specification (or, usually even more pronounced, first differences), see Roberts 
and Tybout (1997); Mairesse and Hall (1996); Griliches and Mairesse (1997); Blundell and Bond 
(2000). The main casualty is usually the coefficient on the capital stock, supposedly because the capital 
stock is especially difficult to measure accurately (Tybout, 1992). 
14 If we exclude capital from the regression, we can reject constant returns at the 1 per cent 
level, suggesting decreasing returns to scale.   8 
Column [3] we allow for dynamics. The results are very similar to those in Column [1] once 
we compute the long-run values of the coefficients, and constant returns to scale is easily 
accepted. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is equal to 0.18, which suggests 
dynamics to be important though it quite probably also reflects omitted fixed effects and/or 
serial correlation in the residual.  
The results reported in Columns [1]-[3] are biased and inconsistent if explanatory 
variables are endogenous or measured with errors. We therefore proceed to the system GMM 
estimator. Throughout the analysis we will report two-step GMM estimates, and t-statistics 
that are based on robust, finite sample corrected standard errors (see Windmeijer, 2000).
15 In 
order to facilitate comparison with Columns [1] and [2], our first system GMM model has 
been estimated without the lagged dependent variable. Results are reported in Column [4].
16 
The estimated coefficient on employment is equal to 0.20, and significant at the 1 per cent 
level, which can be compared with 0.14 in the OLS model and 0.11 in the within 
specification. More dramatically, the estimated capital coefficient is 0.07, hence substantially 
higher than in the OLS (0.03) and within (0.0005) specifications, and close to being 
significant at the 5 per cent level (the p-value is 0.057). The input elasticities sum to 1.03, to 
be compared to 0.83 for the within specification and 1.00 for the static OLS model. We 
cannot, however, reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale (p-value = 0.48). We 
examine if the elasticity coefficients are stable across industries by interacting dummy 
variables for sector with the inputs and testing for the significance of these interaction terms.
17 
The second part of the table reports the associated p-values for each input, and it is quite clear 
that the assumption of constant slope coefficients is not very restrictive.  
In Column [5], we add the lagged dependent variable to the set of explanatory 
variables. To deal with the Nickell (1981) bias, we treat the lagged dependent variable as 
endogenous, using instruments as outlined in the notes to the table. The coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable is 0.06, and insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that 
firms adjust to their new long-run levels fairly rapidly, and it is therefore not surprising that 
allowing for dynamics of this form has very little impact on the results. When computing the 
implied long-run values of the coefficients, these are always very close to the coefficients 
reported in Column [4]. 
The models in Columns [4] and [5] appear to be reasonably well specified. Once we 
instrument the Cobb-Douglas specification appears to be fully acceptable. The Sargan and the 
difference-Sargan tests indicate that the instruments are valid, and there is little evidence that 
slope coefficients vary across industries. Further, the results appear to be reasonable. The fact 
that the coefficients on labour and capital are higher than in the OLS specifications, whereas 
those on raw materials and indirect costs are not, is according to our expectations. Raw 
materials and indirect costs are flexible inputs that will be relatively easy to adjust in response 
to changes in demand, thus resulting in feedback effects. Labour and capital are less flexible 
                                                 
15 It is well known that the asymptotic standard errors in two-step GMM estimators can be 
severely downward biased in finite samples (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991). As a consequence, 
researchers often draw inference based on one-step GMM estimators, which are less efficient than the 
two-step estimators. However, Windmeijer (2000) shows how the asymptotic two-step standard errors 
can be corrected when the sample size is finite. Monte Carlo evidence reported by Bond and 
Windmeijer (2001) indicates that this procedure yields a much more reliable basis for inference than 
relying on the asymptotic standard errors. 
16 See table notes for information about the instrument set.  
17 The tests for heterogeneity across industries in slope parameters and for the translog 
specification were based on the criterion-based test statistic  )) ( ) ( ( 2 2
U R
RU J J N D β β − = , where 
U
2 β  is 
the two-step GMM estimator in the unrestricted model, 
R
2 β  is the two-step GMM estimator in the 
restricted model, and J( ) denotes the Sargan statistic. Under the null hypothesis,  RU D  follows a Chi-
squared distribution with the degrees of freedom being equal to the number of restrictions (see Bond et 
al, 2000).     9 
and hence less susceptible to bias due to feedback effects
18; further, they are probably more 
difficult to measure accurately than materials, implying that the measurement error effect will 
be more pronounced. Finally constant returns to scale cannot be rejected. 
We have addressed two of our three concerns. From the production function we find 
no evidence for non-homotheticity and, with constant returns to scale, owners will be 
indifferent as to the scale of their output. What of the relative importance of human capital in 
determining labour productivity? We know from Table 1 that there is a substantial differential 
in labour productivity over size: large firms are on average about 170 per cent more 
productive than micro firms and about 120 per cent more productive than small firms. How 
much of the size differential in productivity is due to differences in factor inputs and how 
much is due to differences in human capital? To answer this, we combine the parameter 
estimates from Table 3 with differences in mean values of the regressors (purged of time and 
industry effects) over size, to decompose the productivity differential into components 
attributable to differences in observables. We use parameter estimates from Columns [3] and 
[5], and the mean values for large and micro firms. Results are shown in Table 4. The 
decomposition implied by the system GMM estimator gives a predicted total differential of 
160 per cent, where 83 per cent is attributed to raw materials and indirect costs and 19 per 
cent to capital intensity. This can be compared with the OLS model, where the contribution of 
raw materials is 112 per cent and that of capital intensity is only 7 per cent. Naturally, these 
discrepancies reflect differences in the estimated technology parameters. The contribution of 
human capital is very modest in both models. The GMM estimates imply that tenure accounts 
for about 5 per cent of the differential and education and age next to nothing. 
 
5  Earnings and Firm Size 
 
We use similar econometric techniques in estimating the earnings function as that used in the 
last section for the production function. We use the same panel as that for the production 
function and the human capital variables are directly comparable between the two functions.  
In Table 5 Column [1] we present the OLS estimates for the standard Mincerian 
earnings function based on firm level averages. The estimated coefficient on size is equal to 
0.05 and significant at the five per cent level. The coefficients on education and age are 
significant at the five per cent level or better, while the estimated parameter on tenure is 
significant at the ten per cent level.
19 The results are very similar to that found in previous 
studies using early rounds of this data set, Bigsten et al (2000) and Jones (2001).
20 However 
these specifications for the earnings function are inadequate for similar reasons to those 
already discussed for the production function: the size effect will be endogenous in that any 
effect from size onto earnings will induce the firms to economise on labour, it will be 
correlated with firm fixed effects so the results, either at the individual or the firm level, are 
wholly uninformative as to the true size effect on earnings. Introducing controls for fixed 
effects in Column [2] more than halves the education coefficient, and substantially reduces 
the importance of the age variable. The estimated coefficient on employment is 0.06, but not 
significant. In Column [3] we allow for dynamics in the OLS specification, which reduces the 
size coefficient considerably.  
In Column [4] we present the first of the GMM estimates in which all the regressors 
are treated as endogenous and we allow for a dynamic specification. The size effect is once 
again substantial and significant at the ten per cent level. The model suggests that in the long 
                                                 
18 Also recall that the capital variable is lagged one period in all specifications. 
19 We have also estimated the earnings function using the individual data. In this regression 
the coefficient on size is larger, 0.16, while the coefficients on the human capital variables are similar. 
Results are available on request from the authors.  
20 Based on individual data, Bigsten et al (2000, p.810) report a coefficient on years of 
education using three waves of this data equal to 0.09, which compares with 0.07 in Table 5. Jones 
(2001, p. 71) uses two years of the individual data and reports an education coefficient of 0.07.   10 
run a 10 per cent rise in firm size is associated with a 1.6 per cent rise in earnings. It will be 
noted that the point estimate on education is negative while the estimates for average age are 
much lower than those in the OLS. The coefficient on average tenure is identical between the 
specifications. In Table 5 Column [5] we use a more restricted set of instruments to test if the 
point estimates on size are sensitive to the instruments chosen.
21 The result is no significant 
change in the long run coefficients and the coefficient on the log of employment is now 
significant at the 5 per cent level.
22  
What do the results imply as to the relative roles of size and human capital as 
determinants of earnings? In Table 6 we present three decompositions of the effects of size 
and human capital on the log of earnings based on the regressions from Table 5. In the first 
column we use the OLS estimates from Table 5 Column [1]. The OLS estimates imply that 
earnings will rise by a total of 130 per cent: 8.9 per cent from size, 14.6 per cent from 
education, 24.9 per cent from tenure and 47.8 from age. As Table 1 has shown earnings rise 
by a factor of three in moving between these size categories. Clearly most of this rise cannot 
be explained by the OLS estimates of the returns on human capital. In Table 6 Columns [2] 
and [3] we report the results using the estimates from Table 5 Columns [4] and [5]. The rise in 
earnings from the point estimates from these two equations range from 198 per cent to 265 
per cent thus bracketing the actual rise in earnings of 210 per cent shown in Table 1. Of this 
rise by far the most important effect comes from the size of the firm measured by 
employment.  
We have shown that not only does the size effect remain when we have controlled for 
fixed effects but it is the single most important determinant of earnings. The issue remains as 
to whether it is efficiency wages or rent-sharing that accounts for the size effect. We turn to 
that question in the next section. 
 
6   Rent Sharing and Efficiency Wages 
 
Our formulation of the rent-sharing hypothesis in Section 2 postulates that shocks to 
profitability will affect earnings. We now proceed to use our production function as the basis 
for a series of tests as to whether we can explain earnings with output or output by the wage 
premium, conditional on firm fixed effects.  
  In Table 7 Column [1] we take the predicted output from the production function in 
Table 3 Column [5] and use it as a regressor in the earnings function. The result is to reduce 
the size of the coefficient on log employment from 0.11 to –0.02 and it is now wholly 
insignificant.
23 In Column [2] we drop the log of employment term and the predicted output 
from the production function now has a t statistic of 2.3.
24 The capital skill complementarity 
hypothesis has been interpreted as suggesting that the relevant variables to enter the earnings 
function is the capital labour ratio. We test for this in Column [3]. However the there is no 
                                                 
21 See notes to the table for details about the instrument set. 
22 It can be noted that the Difference-Sargan test indicates that instrument validity for the 
levels equation is marginal as we can reject the null hypothesis at the 10 per cent level (but not at the 5 
per cent level). We will return to this issue in the next section where we report alternative 
specifications of the earnings equation. 
23 It can also be noted that for this specification the Difference-Sargan test indicates that we 
can safely accept instrument validity for the levels equation. In contrast, for the specifications reported 
in Columns [4] and [5], Table 5, instrument validity appears to be marginal for the levels equation.  
24 Because predicted output is a generated regressor the standard errors should be corrected. 
We used the methods proposed by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1994) to correct the one-step standard 
errors. Such corrections had very minor results: for no coefficient did the associated standard error 
change by more than 1 per cent, and for most coefficients there was virtually no effect at all. Correcting 
the two-step standard errors is computationally difficult because of the finite sample correction of the 
covariance matrix (see footnote 15). Given the negligible effects on the one-step results, we therefore 
decided to report standard errors which have not been corrected for the generated regressor.    11 
change in the coefficient on log employment term, and it is still significant at the 10 per cent 
level. The coefficient on the capital labour ratio term is highly insignificant. In Columns [4] 
and [5] we report the effects of using lags of profits per employee, following inter alia 
Blanchflower et al (1996).
25 While the second lag is positive and significant at the ten per cent 
level the size coefficient is only marginally lower than in the baseline specification. Indeed 
the long-run size coefficient is identical, 0.16, to that reported in Table 5, Column [4]. Adding 
predicted output to this specification results in a negative and highly insignificant size 
coefficient (not reported). In Column [5], finally, we exclude the size variable, and include 
predicted output and two lags of profit per employee. The estimated coefficient on predicted 
log output is 0.15 and significant at the five per cent level, while the coefficients on the profit 
per employee terms are unchanged. We interpret these results as showing that the size effect 
on earnings can be given a rent-sharing interpretation. 
  Finally, we turn to the efficiency wage hypothesis. In Table 8 we re-estimate the 
Cobb-Douglas production function including the earnings variable as an additional regressor. 
Since we control for observed human capital this variable can be interpreted as a wage 
premium. In the OLS model, reported in Column [1], the earnings coefficient is positive but 
only significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level. We can reject the hypothesis 
that the coefficients on earnings and employment are the same at the 10 per cent level and 
nearly at the 5 per cent level (the p-value is 0.051). Once we control for firm fixed effects, 
Columns [2] and [3], the coefficient on earnings more than halves and is no longer significant 
at conventional levels. Our interpretation of these findings is that there is no evidence in 
favour of efficiency wages in this data. 
 
7  Summary and Conclusion 
 
The central question posed in this paper is the relationship between firm size, earnings and 
productivity. There is a large dispersion of labour productivity, capital intensity and earnings 
by firm size in the data for manufacturing firms in Ghana. This size dispersion is not due to 
technology, i.e. it does not reflect the use of more capital intensive technology by some 
sectors, and it is not a result of changes in labour productivity during the course of the 
surveys. These differences are very substantial in that both labour productivity and earnings 
rise by a factor of three or more in moving from a micro firm, one with less than 6 employees, 
to a large firm, one with more than 100.  
  We have estimated production and earnings functions using a system GMM 
estimator, to investigate whether there is a size effect on earnings. The GMM estimator 
allows us to control for issues of endogeneity, measurement errors and firm fixed effects, 
where the latter would capture for instance time invariant unobservable quality of the 
workforce and the unobservable characteristics of their workplace. We have argued that such 
an effect can be found and that size is the most important of the factors determining earnings 
across firms of differing size. Using a production function we have shown that constant 
returns to scale is not rejected by the data and, once we allow for measurement error, the 
Cobb-Douglas form with constant returns to scale can be accepted, thus accepting the 
hypothesis that technology is homothetic. We have also shown that observable skills are of 
minor importance in explaining differences in productivity across size.  
Given our estimates of the production function we have used the predictions to show 
that the size effect in the earnings function can be given an interpretation as a rent-sharing 
variable. The results show that the effect of predicted output on earnings occurs together with 
an effect from lagged profits. While the former is consistent with a risk-sharing interpretation 
of the data, the latter is not. Finally we have considered the possible role of efficiency wages 
by asking if the productivity of firms is determined by the wage premium. Once controls are 
                                                 
25 Because of the introduction of the lagged profit terms, this yields a smaller sample: 518 
observations on 115 firms.   12 
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TABLE 1  
MEANS OF PRODUCTIVITY AND EARNINGS VARIABLES 
PURGED OF TIME AND SECTORAL EFFECTS 
         
 Large  Medium  Small  Micro  All 
         
         
Log Output per Employee  15.6  14.9  14.8  14.6  14.9 
(millions of 1991 cedis)  (0.8)  (1.1)  (0.9)  (0.8)  (1.0) 
         
Log Capital per Employee  17.6  16.5  15.2  15.1  15.9 
(millions of 1991 cedis)  (0.8)  (1.5)  (1.6)  (1.8)  (12.3) 
         
Capital to Output Ratio  4.2  4.8  3.4  3.8  3.9 
  (2.9)  (4.8) (1.9) (2.5)  (3.2) 
         
Log Hourly Earnings per   5.56  5.14  4.70  4.43  4.94 
Worker (1991 cedis)  (0.5)  (0.7)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (0.9) 
         
Average Education (Years)  11.8  10.8  10.2  10.1  10.6 
  (2.0)  (2.0) (2.4) (2.4)  (2.3) 
         
Average Age in Years  38  36  31  30  34 
  (6)  (7) (6) (7)  (7) 
         
Average Tenure in Years  12.9  12.3  9.8  9.2  10.9 
  (4.4)  (4.6) (2.9) (4.6)  (4.2) 
         
Number of Observations  125  206  319  82  732 
Number of Firms  29  43  63  18  153 
         
 
Note: The means reported in this table are obtained from regressing the variables on sector, time and 
size dummies. The size effect is then obtained from the size dummies in this regression. The size of the 
firm is its total number of employees when first observed in the sample, where a micro firm has less 
than six employees, a small firm has from 6 to 29, a medium firm has from 30 to 99, while a large firm 
has 100, or more, employees.  
The data is annual over the period 1991 to 1997. The figures in ( ) are standard deviations. As 
explained in the text firm-level price indices are used to deflate the output and inputs for the firm while 
the Consumer Price Index is used to deflate earnings.    17 
TABLE 2 
 SELECTED ESTIMATES BASED ON TRANSLOG PRODUCTION FUNCTION REGRESSIONS  
     
  [1] OLS   [2] Within  [4] SYS
a  
SPECIFICATION TESTS     
Homotheticity (p-value)
(1)  0.38 0.53 0.78 
     
Homotheticity and constant 
returns to scale (p-value)
 (2) 
0.49 0.57 0.87 
Quasi-concavity (proportion of 
observations)
(3) 
0.38 0.45 0.53 
Monotonicity (proportion of 
observations)
(3)  
0.63 0.62 0.55 
Cobb-Douglas (p-value)
 (4) 0.00 0.00 0.73 
     
Sargan test (p-value)
(5)     0.31 
     
SUMMARY OF SPECIFICATION      
Time  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  No  No 
Inputs  Endogenous  No No Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Lag of dependent variable  No  No  No 
     
Number of Observations  732  732  732 
Number of Firms  153  153  153 
Note: The empirical translog specification is of the form 
, ln ln 2 1 ln ln ∑∑ ∑ + + + =
km mit kit km j jit j it it controls X X X h Y β β α  where the notation is as 
explained in Section 2. Test statistics are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.  
a) Based on two-step system GMM results. Test statistics are based on robust, finite sample corrected 
standard errors (see Windmeijer, 2000). The instrument set for the differenced equation consists of the 
level of output in periods s = t-3,…, s = 1, and the levels of employment, physical capital, raw 
materials, indirect costs and human capital, in periods s = t-2,…, s = 1. The instrument set for the levels 
equation consists of employment, physical capital, raw materials, indirect costs and human capital, 
differenced, in period t-1, output differenced in t-2, a constant and year dummies.  
(1) For homotheticity, H0: ∑ =
m km 0 β , k = 1,2,3,4. Wald tests were used for all models. 
(2) For constant returns to scale and homotheticity, H0: ∑ =
j j 1 β  and ∑ =
m km 0 β , k = 1,2,3,4. 
Wald tests were used for all models. 
(3) See footnote 11 for a description of how we investigate quasi-concavity and monotonicity. 
(4) Tests for the joint significance of the coefficients on the non-linear terms in the translog 
specification. For the OLS and Within specifications a Wald test was used and in the system GMM 
models the tests were based on the value of the  RU D statistic (see footnote 17). 
 (5) Tests for the validity of the instruments.   18 
TABLE 3 
COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATES 
       
  [1] OLS  [2] Within  [3] OLS  [4] SYS
a   [5] SYS
a  
       
PARAMETER       
log  Employment  0.14 0.11 0.10 0.20 0.20 
 (4.22)**  (1.78)
+ (3.14)**  (2.98)**  (2.43)* 
log Capital(t-1)  0.03 0.0005  0.02 0.07 0.07 




log  Raw  Materials  0.69 0.64 0.61 0.69 0.64 
  (29.20)** (17.94)** (23.00)** (17.33)** (12.24)** 
log  Indirect  Costs  0.13 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.06 
  (5.50)** (2.94)** (4.78)** (1.99)*  (1.93)
+ 
Years of Education / 100  1.28  0.38  1.20  -0.11  -0.10 
 (1.81)
+ (0.41)  (1.94)
+ (0.09)  (0.08) 
Age  0.04 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.07 
  (2.38)* (2.94)**  (2.16)* (3.61)**  (3.15)** 
Age
2  /  100  -0.06 -0.13 -0.05 -0.11 -0.10 
  (2.31)* (3.24)**  (2.09)* (3.71)**  (3.40)** 
Years of Tenure / 100   0.33  1.69  0.29  1.45  1.29 
  (0.70) (2.90)**  (0.65) (1.84)
+ (1.67)
+ 
log Output(t-1)     0.18    0.06 
     (6.33)**    (1.21) 
Any Foreign Ownership  0.01    0.01     
  (0.24)   (0.26)    
Ghanaian State Ownership  0.04    0.06     
  (0.49)   (0.79)    
Firm Age / 100  0.22    0.15     
  (1.09)   (0.85)    
Union 0.06    -0.001     
  (0.79)   (0.02)    
       
Long-run returns to scale  1.00  0.83  1.02  1.03  1.04 
       
CONTROL VARIABLES       
Time  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Dummies  Yes No  Yes No  No 
Inputs  Endogenous  No No No Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
       
Number  of  Observations  732 732 732 732 732 
Number  of  Firms  153 153 153 153 153 
       
Continues… 
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-VALUES) 
  [1] OLS  [2] Within  [3] OLS  [4] SYS   [5] SYS  
          
INDHET, EMPLOYMENT
(1) 0.61  0.39 0.54  0.29  0.56 
INDHET, CAPITAL
(1) 0.52  0.13  0.46  0.27  0.77 
INDHET, RAW MATERIALS
(1) 0.27 0.55  0.37  0.27  0.79 
INDHET, INDIRECT COSTS
(1) 0.72 0.86  0.77  0.19  0.64 
AGE
(2) 0.06  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.00 
TRANSLOG
(3) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.73  0.24 
CRS
(4) 0.94  0.16  0.44  0.48  0.40 
M1
(5)       0.00  0.00 
M2
(6)       0.03  0.07 
SARGAN
(7)      0.39  0.25 
DIFF-SARGAN
(8)       0.96  0.77 
          
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of output. t-statistics based on standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) are reported in ( ). Significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per 
cent level is indicated by *, ** and 
+ respectively.  
a) The system GMM (SYS) estimator is a combination of a GMM differenced estimator and a GMM 
levels estimator (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). The reported coefficients are two-step estimates, and 
the associated t-statistics are based on robust, finite sample corrected standard errors (see Windmeijer, 
2000). The instrument set for the differenced equation consists of the level of output in periods s = t-
3,…, s = 1, and the levels of employment, physical capital, raw materials, indirect costs and human 
capital, in periods s = t-2,…, s = 1. The instrument set for the levels equation consists of employment, 
physical capital, raw materials, indirect costs and human capital, differenced, in period t-1, output 
differenced in t-2, a constant and year dummies.  
(1) Tests for heterogeneity across industries in the associated slope coefficient. This is implemented by 
interacting the relevant variable with dummy variables for industry, and testing appropriately for the 
joint significance of the coefficients on the interaction terms. For the OLS and Within specifications a 
standard Wald test was used, whereas the tests in the system GMM models were based on the  RU D  
statistic (see footnote 17). 
(2) Tests for the joint significance of the age and age
2 terms. Wald tests were used for all specifications. 
(3) Tests for the joint significance of the coefficients on the non-linear terms in the translog 
specification. For the OLS and Within specifications a Wald test was used and in the system GMM 
models the tests were based on the value of the  RU D statistic. 
(4) Tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients on employment, physical capital, raw materials and 
indirect costs sum to unity. For the dynamic specifications (i.e. with the lagged dependent variable), 
this test is based on the associated long-run values of the coefficients. Wald tests were used for all 
specifications.  
(5) Tests the null hypothesis that the differenced residuals in periods t and t-1 are uncorrelated. 
(6) Tests the null hypothesis that the differenced residuals in periods t and t-2 are uncorrelated. 
(7) Tests for the validity of the instruments in the differenced and levels equations. 
(8) Tests for the validity of the instruments in the levels equation.   20 
 
TABLE 4  
THE DETERMINANTS OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
    
Percentage increase in output per 
employee from a move from a micro 









    
Log Employment
(a) 7.1  14.5 
Log Capital per Employee  7.2  19.0 
Log Materials per Employee  68.8  61.7 
Log Indirect Costs per Employee  25.5  13.3 
Education 2.5  -0.2 
Tenure 1.3  5.2 
Age 0.0  -0.9 
    
Total 151.3  159.9 
    
  
Note: The percentage increase in output per employee as shown in Table 1 is 172. 
(a) Under constant returns to scale this should be zero. The positive numbers reflect the fact that the 
point estimates in Models [3] and [5] indicate increasing returns to scale. When tested, constant returns 
cannot be rejected. 
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TABLE 5  
EARNINGS FUNCTION ESTIMATES 
          
  [1] OLS  [2] Within  [3] OLS  [4] SYS
$ 
a  [5] SYS
$ 
b 
          
PARAMETER         
log Employment  0.05  0.06  0.01  0.11  0.16 
 (2.07)*  (0.83)  (0.79)  (1.8)
+  (2.0)* 
Years of Education  0.07  0.03  0.03  -0.01  0.01 
 (3.89)**  (1.37)  (2.34)*  (0.3)  (0.6) 
Age 0.25  0.11  0.14  0.08  0.13 
 (4.18)**  (1.62)  (3.30)**  (1.9)
+  (2.92)** 
Age
2/ 100  -0.29  -0.11  0.00  -0.08  -0.13 
 (3.12)**  (1.15)  (2.65)**  (1.4)
  (2.3)
* 
Years of Tenure  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03 
 (1.94)
+ (1.98)* (2.10)*  (1.5)  (1.5) 
log Earnings(t-1)     0.53  0.29  0.17 
     (11.13)**  (2.7)**  (1.2) 
          
Long-run effect of log 
Employment  
0.05 0.06  0.03  0.16 0.19 
Adjusted R
2  0.59 0.78  0.72    
          
CONTROL VARIABLES         
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regressors Endogenous  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
          
          
Number of Observations  732  732  732  732  732 
Number of Firms  153  153  153  153  153 
          
 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-VALUES) 
       
AGE 
(1)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
M1
(2)      0.00  0.00 
M2
(2)      0.83  0.68 
SARGAN
(2)      0.16  0.20 
DIFF-SARGAN
(2)      0.06  0.09 
       
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly earnings. t-statistics based on standard errors robust 
to heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) are reported in parenthesis. Significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent 
and 10 per cent level is indicated by *, ** and 
+ respectively.  
$ The reported coefficients are two-step estimates, and the associated t-statistics are based on robust, 
finite sample corrected standard errors (see Windmeijer, 2000). 





a)  The instrument set for the differenced equation consists of employment, all the human capital 
variables, in levels, in periods s = t-2, t-3,…, s = 1, and the level of earnings in periods s = t-2, t-3,…, s 
= 1. The instrument set for the levels equation consists of employment, human capital and earnings, 
differenced, in period t-1 a constant and year dummies.  
b) The instrument set for the differenced equation consists of employment, all the human capital 
variables, in levels, in periods s = t-2 only and the level of earnings in periods s = t-3 only. The 
instrument set for the levels equation consists of employment, and human capital differenced, in period 
t-1, earnings differenced in period t-2, a constant and year dummies 
(1) Tests for the joint significance of the age and age
2 terms. Wald tests were used for all specifications. 
(2) See Table 3.  
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TABLE 6  
THE DETERMINANTS OF EARNINGS  
 
Percentage increase in hourly earnings 











      
Log Employment  8.9  88.0  109.6 
      
Education 14.6  -1.9  3.1 
      
Tenure 24.9  18.0  16.7 
      
Age 47.8  37.5  44.9 
      
Total 130  198  265 
      
 
Note: The percentage increase in hourly earnings shown in Table 1 is 210. 
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TABLE 7  
ADDITIONAL EARNINGS FUNCTION ESTIMATES 
          
 [1]  SYS
a [2]  SYS
a [3]  SYS
b [4]  SYS
c  [5] SYS
d 
          
PARAMETER          
Log Employment  -0.02    0.12  0.08   
 (0.16)    (1.94)
+ (1.09)   
Years of Education  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
 (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.52)  (0.29)  (0.45) 
Age 0.07  0.07  0.07  0.04  -0.02 
 (1.21)  (1.25)  (1.92)
+ (0.75)  (0.39) 
Age
2/ 100  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.03  0.04 
 (0.84)  (0.86)  (1.36)  (0.45)  (0.65) 
Years of Tenure  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04 
 (1.74)
+ (1.76)
+ (1.61) (1.61) (1.97)
+ 
Log Earnings(t-1) 0.29  0.29  0.30  0.49  0.48 
 (2.82)**  (2.88)**  (3.15)**  (2.17)*  (2.48)* 
Log Capital / Employment      0.03     
     (0.80)     
Predicted Log Output  0.12  0.11      0.15 
 (1.37)  (2.30)*      (2.45)* 
Profit / Employee t-1       0.01  0.02 
       (0.38)  (1.49) 
Profit / Employee t-2       0.05  0.05 
       (1.85)
+ (2.17)* 
          
Long-run effect of log 
Employment  
-0.03  0.17  0.16   
          
          
Number of Observations  732  732  732  518  518 
Number of Firms  153  153  153  115  115 
          
 S PECIFICATION TESTS (p-VALUES) 
          
AGE 
(1)  0.07 0.07  0.04  0.51  0.27 
M1
(2) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
M2
(2) 0.80  0.79  0.70  0.32  0.32 
SARGAN
(2) 0.19  0.21  0.25  0.09  0.22 
DIFF-SARGAN
(2) 0.29  0.29  0.07  0.15  0.60 
          
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly earnings. t-statistics based on robust, finite sample 
corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2000) are reported in parenthesis. Significance at the 1 per cent, 
5 per cent and 10 per cent level is indicated by *, ** and 
+ respectively. All regressions include time 
dummies. All regressions control for fixed effects.  




a) The instrument set for the differenced equation consists of log earnings, predicted log output, log 
employment and all the human capital variables, in levels, in periods s = t-2, t-3,…, s = 1. The 
instrument set for the levels equation consists of employment, predicted log output, human capital and 
earnings, differenced, in period t-1, a constant and year dummies.  
b) The instrument set for the differenced equation consists of log earnings, log capital-labour ratio, log 
employment and all the human capital variables, in levels, in periods s = t-2, t-3,…, s = 1. The 
instrument set for the levels equation consists of employment, capital-labour ratio, human capital and 
earnings, differenced, in period t-1, a constant and year dummies.  
c) The instrument set for the differenced equation consists of log earnings, log employment and all the 
human capital variables, in levels, in periods s = t-2, t-3,…, s = 1, while the profit per employee terms 
serve as their own instruments. The instrument set for the levels equation consists of employment, 
human capital and earnings, differenced, in period t-1, a constant and year dummies.  
d) The instrument set for the differenced equation consists of log earnings, predicted log output, log 
employment and all the human capital variables, in levels, in periods s = t-2, t-3,…, s = 1, while the 
profit per employee terms serve as their own instruments. The instrument set for the levels equation 
consists of employment, predicted log output, human capital and earnings, differenced, in period t-1, a 
constant and year dummies.  
(1) Tests for the joint significance of the age and age
2 terms. Wald tests were used for all specifications. 
(2) See Table 3.   26 
TABLE 8 
TESTING FOR EFFICIENCY WAGES: PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATES 
     
  [1] OLS  [2] Within  [3] SYS
a  
     
PARAMETER     
log  Employment  0.15 0.11 0.20 
 (4.61)**  (1.75)
+ (2.39)* 
log Capital(t-1) 0.03  -0.0002  0.06 
 (2.34)*  (0.002)  (1.83)
+ 
log Raw Materials  0.69  0.64  0.64 
  (29.51)** (18.24)** (12.09)** 
log Indirect Costs  0.12  0.08  0.06 
  (5.44)** (2.92)** (1.87)
+ 
Years of Education / 100  0.01  0.00  0.00 
  (1.30) (0.33) (0.06) 
Age  0.03 0.08 0.06 
 (1.45)  (2.61)**  (2.84)** 
Age
2 / 100  -0.05  -0.13  -0.10 
 (1.53)  (2.95)**  (3.29)** 
Years of Tenure / 100   1.28  1.58  1.24 
 (0.27)  (2.53)*  (1.44) 
log Output(t-1)     0.06 
     (1.21) 
log  Earnings  0.06 0.03 0.02 
  (1.67)
+  (0.61) (0.62) 
     
M1
(1)    0.00 
M2
(1)    0.07 
SARGAN
(1)    0.26 
DIFF-SARGAN
(1)   0.82 
     
Number of Observations  732  732  732 
Number of Firms  153  153  153 
     
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of output. t-statistics based on standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) are reported in ( ). Significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per 
cent level is indicated by *, ** and 
+ respectively.  
a) The reported coefficients are two-step estimates, and the associated t-statistics are based on robust, 
finite sample corrected standard errors (see Windmeijer, 2000). The instrument set for the differenced 
equation consists of the level of output in periods s = t-3,…, s = 1, the levels of employment, physical 
capital, raw materials, indirect costs and human capital, in periods s = t-2,…, s = 1, while the earnings 
variable (differenced) serves as its own instrument. The instrument set for the levels equation consists 
of employment, physical capital, raw materials, indirect costs and human capital, differenced, in period 
t-1, output differenced in t-2, a constant and year dummies.  
(1) See Table 3.  
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Appendix 1: The system GMM estimator 
 
This appendix provides a brief description of the system GMM estimator. For more details 
see e.g. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell et al (2000). 
 
Consider 
(A1)   it i it it x y ε µ β + + ′ = ,     t = 1,2,…,T, 
where i and t are firm and time indices, yit is the dependent variable, xit is a row vector of 
order k of explanatory variables possibly including lags of the dependent variable, β is a 
column vector of parameters of order k, µi is a fixed effect potentially correlated with xit and 
εit is a residual potentially correlated with xit. To eliminate the fixed effect we take first 
differences: 
(A2)   it it it x y ε β ∆ + ′ ∆ = ∆ ,     t = 2,3,…,T. 
If  it x ∆  is correlated with the differenced residual, the standard OLS estimator will be biased 
and inconsistent. However, assume that there exists a set of instruments that enable us to form 
a vector of moment conditions of order q, defined as  
(A3)   () 0 = ∆ ′ it it z E ε .  
Provided q≥k , we can obtain a consistent GMM estimator of β by minimising the quadratic 
(A4)   () ()() GMM N GMM GMM g W g J β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 − ′
= , 
where  () ⋅ g  is the sum over the sample moment conditions of the form in (A3) and 
1 −
N W  is a 
weight matrix (Hansen, 1982). A common procedure is to use lags of xit as instruments for the 
differenced equation (A2), and because more instruments become available for higher t, we 
can form a matrix of instrument as  
 
   x i1  0 0 …  0 …  0   t  = 1 + l 
(A5)  zi  =  0  xi1  xi2 … 0  … 0   t  = 2 + l 
    . . . …  . …  .    
    0 0 0 …  xi1 … xi,T-l   t  = T 
 
where l is the lag length in use. As discussed in the text, the resulting differenced GMM 
estimator often performs poorly in practice due to the problem of weak instruments. Blundell 
and Bond (1998) proposed combining the differenced equation (A2) with the levels equation 
(A1), for which lagged differences  of the explanatory variables may serve as valid 
instruments. The vector of moment conditions is then defined as 
(A6)   ( ) 0
  =
+ u zi
' E , 
where 











ui   
and 
   zi  0 0 …  0   
(A8)  =
+
i z  0  ∆xi1  0 …  0  t  = 1 + l 
   0  0  ∆xi2  … 0     
    .  . . …  .    
    0  0 0 …  ∆xi,T-l    t = T 
 
The system GMM estimates are then obtained by minimising (A4). 
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